Consultants, Lawyers, Shareholders, and Boardmembers.

It’s a forgone conclusion that Intel will be broken up in 2-5 years. They should announce it in the 1st quarter of 2025 and have it completed by the beginning of 2H of 2026. But the Intel board won’t let it go that fast. In fact the Intel board is the main problem now. Calcified, financialized and constipated thinking is the currency of the realm for Intel’s board.

Global Foundries need to get rid of the failures from IBM and Motorola in its leadership. Even Intel Fab people, clearly failed at 4 nm, would be better than the GloFo leaders who gave up at 10 nm and chose to run away from high density logic.

Poor guy started as a Tech and scraped his way up to a MS in CS, not a great training for Fans which is very different from the virtual world of coding or the world of Design using pre packaged EDA software. Fab is science in action everyday, requires as leaders PhDs like PT’s predecessors as Intel CEOs Andy G. and Craig B. ). The US has been losing competitiveness in Fabs because much too abundant EEs w/o adequate training keep gate crashing into Fab management on strength of the fact that they can do and understand the results of e-test s a nd they are after all the end users of Chips.

GloFo was saddled from the beginning with the failures from not just AMD but also from IBM & Motorola. In depth modeling applied to process development is still not done well. I do not know this Naga now in charge of PD at Intel but seems that very conflicting claims about the yields and defect trends for 1.8 A are being made. The best way to get device design & yields up is to put PhDs in Solid State and Metallurgists / Materials Scientists in charge and keep the EE hackers out.

You refreshingly lead with the right question, but I‘m afraid you’re asking it at the wrong level of granularity.

It starts with treating the Intel foundry business as a whole. And even if I am a bloody outsider (geographically and know-how), I can’t help myself asking: who’d even want it all?

Probably that’s because I remember the shock of just how much IBM charged for their foundry business.

Sure it’s a lot of assets, but what about the liabilities? Right down to the cost of cleanup if they were to dismantle it today and leave green pasture: how much would that cost vs its current value?

I can see lots of spilled coffee over that question, but today that’s a due dilligence item.

Probably the only one to buy Intel with little hesitance (at nearer Global Foundry prices than a patriotic premium) would be China.

That’s because they’d hold no punches picking it apart into very tiny pieces, separating the technology from the culture and the people and leaving behind every asset that is actually a liability: surprisingly free market from a people’s republic…

In a world without digital divides the depth of the Mariana trench, an Intel replaced by green pastures wouldn’t leave the world without things it desperately needs: there is nothing they produce where others aren’t capable and willing of filling in. At least in terms of technology, perhaps scale would take more time.

But would converting Intel fabs to something TSMC-like operations be cheaper than building new ones for that capacity? Isn’t that what Mr. Gelsinger failed to do in the time he was given?

Currently my impression is the board lacks the confidence that the intermediary steps in that direction won’t fail and bust Intel in a free market. And the board might look for salvation in a China like heavy hand from a Trump administration to steady it.

But even if such a government were to be filled with a few musky men also wise, the perceived and real value of all IDF assets are burning at a rate that keeps accelerating, with only the Intel patent troll making a bit of money.

We might see something new here: too big to fail may turn into too big for any nation to save from dramatic desintegration, because it’s also largely running at software speeds.

1) The board got cold feet under investor pressure on the result of initially a poor situation assessment the picture in an Intel invented reality was just too rosy and some powers figure they were misled. I’ve reported since the beginning the issue of monopoly cost overhang, price at cost operations, the potential Intel would place itself into Chapter 11 and well before Gelsinger became CEO.

2) The how to swallow, originally back in q4 2021, up to $234,500,000,000 in capital investment.

Arizona Expansion, $20 B
Rio Rancho Retrofit $3.5 B
Hillsboro Modernization $3 B
Leixlip Retrofit $8 B
Ohio Greenfield $100 B
Europe $33 B to $95 B
Italy Packaging $4.5 B
Germany Greenfield $18 B with a $781 prepayment

Personally, I would let the whole situation play out, these companies I’ve seen it before the sacrificial lamb, the baby thrown out with the bath water, it happens; Otellini poisoned was my take, Krzanich set up and he knew better the beauties who use all their natural advantages, a lot of them are industrial spies, and then the Chrisitan gets crucified?

I liked Gelsinger for bringing in cultural exposure from outside of Intel culture and the let’s do it attitude. Maybe it was ‘just’ do it that I comprehend having been in leadership roles working in industry and also in sports facing the need for both in specific situations.

Then I liked Krzanich for getting rid of the Intel Inside supply signal in 2016 and Intel Inside in 2018. Only for Intel Inside to come back in 2021 after Gelsinger arrives and that’s an area of Holthaus responsibility as head of CCG marketing.

Intel Inside would again be shut down in it’s horizontal cartel form leaving 2023 only to be brought back for Dell in its vertical form this last quarter which is MJ and CCG marketing.

There are factions with internal players doing their bidding within any enterprise especially State of Intel, and foremost, the ‘spin the fabs’ off contingent which I do not support and have not completed that audit.

My take is the faction that keeps Holthaus in power, ripping Intel off for billions of dollars in unnecessary marketing costs appeasing channels while with Intel legal keep the CEO and board in the dark. Certainly, a misrepresentation by Intel marketing and legal department intent on conduct, and the retaliation should I expect any less, Intel factions attempting to get away with their 13-year violation of Docket 9341 consent agreement at Part IV(A)(1)(7) all the while I’m counseling as monitor to correct.

Pursuant correcting the marketing and communications the legal department, all of which are my fields of expertise, woman managerially, strategically operating on best practice in the palatial organization is how men best handle this. Let the smart woman take the player’s among them out and the reason is smart woman operating interpedently don’t like competing with mistresses or privileged placements. Men operate differently allowing junior eyes and ears on the street for intelligence and control purposes they’re not always the sharpest tools in the shed. From a human resource perspective in a microprocessor design producer there can be creativity voids. Engineers who cannot design as in make good on their high-level tool value to the organization, the better one’s end up in sales and product management, and least creative end up in marketing that can present organizational difficulties especially when they become a favorite of an outside vendor. Mike’s thoughts on human resource a hybrid between Machiavelli’s The Prince and Gracian’s Art of Worldly Wisdom.

3) What Gelsinger and Zinsner found out was the at cost operation and situationally organizational elephantiasis associated monopoly cost overhang that was known necessitating right sizing, to $35 B annual my take, which was an inflection for me this last quarter, where every quarter has been at or near an ‘at cost quarter’ including CCG faking it’s operating margin not accounting for the R&D charge against product sales. This culmination presented a breaking point.

4) What Gelsinger and Zinsner did not know because the legal department and the marketing department are crooks and concealed it. Recall my celebration on November 26, the Chip Act reduction to $7.86 B accommodates within 6.2% the sum of the Intel Inside price fix Federal False Claims recovery for that GSA procurement overcharge. By law Chip Act funds were unavailable to Intel sans the federal false claims theft repayment. This suggests, and the wheels are in motion, that Intel will be put on a payment plan for the States Intel Include price fix recovery the sum of $20,510,500,000.

Again, I would have allowed the situation to play out with Gelsinger in lead. As a consultant would walk right in and right size the operation’s cost structure to $35 B in sales; marketing, product management, communications, investor relations, legal down to skeleton crew of 10 people per department. I’ve not done an audit but if those departments cannot be run like a start-up they’re too large. Audit to determine state of foundry as one component of a federated conglomerate, tour what are no more than a handful of prospects to access their buy-in under the private golf (gold) club model, and report back here at 30, 60, 90 and 130 days.

Subject CEO search Holthouse started at Intel in PR supported and moved up by the proximate entities including all the Intel Inside publishers that stole and ripped off Intel for 30 years Holthaus is out.

If not Zinsser who did not know but now knows he was handed a price at cost operation I’d rather have Rene James as CEO put James in a World Wrestling mud pit with Holthaus and watch Rene James cut Holthaus’s throat.

CEO James is tough nosed put into a hard job at Ampere Davidow always said it was the hard jobs, the hard whole product that proves your worth.

CEO James, Andy Grove might be your friend, but he is not my friend, nor is Otellini and his crew that remains inside Intel needs to be walked out. That includes all in Intel legal department who are trying to escape their contract sales racket.

And if James doesn’t take the CEO job I will go in and audit Intel and release all those findings here to cost optimize the whole entity at $35 B annual and get all the input necessary on a 5 to 7 major customer foundry buy-in to the IF private golf club model.

So said Mark Liu with foundry tenure, Intel Foundry does not need a foundry super star. Zinsner has shown himself successful to those who noticed net profit of $1 per unit produced for the last four quarters, for those knowing how to decompose a financial on data that is not some invented reality. Making that $1 is an industrial management best practice when operating at cost. It showed operations skill but how many noticed on associate clutter and the mimicking syndicate repeaters.

The operation stars are already at Intel. What Intel needs is foundry buy-in from 5 to 7 large customers primarily with big chips to begin because that’s what Intel has proven viable at Intel 3 based on nascent and still incomplete outside production assessment; $0.55 per mem^2 of area for a finished component.

Mike Bruzzone, Camp Marketing

1. *GlobalFoundries would gain access to Intel’s advanced node technology*: Intel’s foundry business has been investing heavily in advanced node development (e.g., 7nm, 5nm, and 3nm). GlobalFoundries would benefit from accessing these advanced nodes, enhancing its competitiveness.
2. *Increased capacity and scale*: The combined entity would have a larger capacity, allowing GlobalFoundries to better serve its existing customers and attract new ones.
3. *Diversification of customer base*: GlobalFoundries would gain access to Intel’s customer base, reducing its dependence on a single customer (e.g., AMD) and increasing its diversification.
4. *Improved financials*: The merger could lead to cost savings, increased efficiency, and improved profitability for GlobalFoundries.

In contrast, Intel might not benefit as much from the merger, as it would likely involve spinning off its foundry business, which could lead to:

1. *Loss of control over its manufacturing destiny*: Intel would no longer have full control over its manufacturing capabilities.
2. *Reduced influence over the direction of the combined entity*: As a minority stakeholder, Intel might have limited influence over the strategic direction of the combined company.

So, while both companies might benefit from a merger, GlobalFoundries would likely be the main beneficiary.

In a merger scenario, the combined entity would bring together:

1. Intel’s strong brand, manufacturing capabilities, and research expertise.
2. AMD’s innovative products, agile business model, and growing market share.
3. Lisa Su’s exceptional leadership, technical expertise, and vision.

The synergy between these components could create a more formidable competitor in the semiconductor industry. Lisa Su’s leadership would be a crucial factor in unlocking this synergy, as she has proven her ability to drive innovation, growth, and success at AMD.

*Value Creation: 1 + 1 + Lisa Su > 3*

The combined entity would likely experience:

1. Increased competitiveness

The value created by this merger would be greater than the sum of Intel and AMD’s individual values, thanks to the synergy and leadership that Lisa Su would bring to the table.

In summary, the concept of the sum of the parts being larger than the whole suggests that a merger between Intel and AMD, with Lisa Su at the helm, could create a more powerful and competitive entity in the semiconductor industry.

HA! I can’t unsee that image in my head….